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Command and Staff College student has written on this topic solidified my decision to write on this subject. I thought I had the opportunity to conquer some new intellectual ground.
My research unveiled that the decision to disband the Iraqi Army was not as simple as I originally thought, and unfortunately, it also revealed the subject has been well covered by journalists, political pundits, and authors. It is amazing how much political debate escaped my attention over the last several years due to the operational tempo of the war. Nevertheless, I feel what I can offer to the subject is an opinion on the strongest influencers to the decision, quantitative consequences of the decision, a recommended solution, and a conclusion from a Marine Officer with a unique qualification. My perspective is one of a combat leader that fought insurgents (who were former Iraqi Army) and then trained and conducted combat operations· with a New Iraqi Army who were formerly insurgents. Armed with the after-actions and historical lessons learned from the occupation of Germany, including the problems associated with de-Nazification, the CPA still elected to ostracize the people that were managing infrastructure and securing the nation. 
II. The Argument "For" Disbanding the Iraqi Military
As of September 2007, Paul Bremer still believed that the decision to disband the Iraqi military was the correct decision and probably the most important decision he made as the head of the CPA. 3 To still feel this way after the war has extended well beyond prediction, one would assume he must have sound reasoning. As Bremer states in his book, My Year in Iraq, he felt he had little choice in the matter -the Iraqi military disbanded itself. 4 The arguments for disbanding the Iraqi military were mostly ethnic based and symbolic, but also punitive and financial, and finally, because the alternative may have been too difficult. The alternative was to recall the Iraqi military and conduct a classic demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process (DDR). 5 It was Bremer's assertion that most of the Iraqi Army was conscripted and displeased with their standing in the defense forces. He felt most of the soldiers would be content in remaining at home as the coalition requested through leaflets prior to the offensive. 6 A part of the coalition's information operations campaign was to convey to Iraqi soldiers that they would be rewarded after the war if they did not resist the coalition. 7 Additionally, the CPA assessed that Shia soldiers would simply not respond to a recall. They believed Shia soldiers would see the invasion turmoil as an opportunity to be free of COlTUpt and abusive Sunni officers.
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Reinforcing the "too difficult" argument is that the military infrastructure, base headquarters, and barracks were abandoned, damaged by coalition forces duriilg shaping operations, and then destroyed by looters seeking anything of value, to include stripping copper wires, pipes, rebar, and brick or stone. 9 Soldiers seeing their leaders flee to escape persecution for Baath Party affiliation, possessed little incentive to remain at their damaged barracks and went home with the their unit weapons and equipment. 10 By the CPA's estimate, recalling the Iraqi military and finding appropriate work spaces and shelter would be a bridge too far. As Walter Slocombe, Defense and Security Advisor for the CPA stated, "All the advantages, [of not disbanding the
Iraqi army] they had run away with, the soldiers, the organization, the discipline, the organic transport. The facts had changed. ,,11
Paul Bremer viewed the Iraqi military as a derogatory symbol instead of an institution that represented sovereignty, survivability, and unity that would eventually provide a common Using a RAND study of previous conflicts requiring a Phase IV type mission, the coalition was vastly undermanned. The report outlines that very little can be achieved during Phase IV without security; moreover there is a positive correlation between troop strength and stability.30 The study states, "the higher the proportion of troops relative to resident population, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted.,,31 In the Kosovo example, there were 20 soldiers for every 1,000 citizens. 32 Using the RAND study formula the author estimates the coalition needed The demobilization of a foreign army-i.e. an army of primarily men, whose means of employment was to be trained to use weapons and explosives in a skilled mannerto kill-is perhaps the greatest and most critical task in a post-conflict environment. Taking away the jobs and weapons in which so many men have depended for so long, and giving them an equivalent civilian occupation in a peacetime (something even highly educated US military personnel find challenging), is a delicate and absolutely vital challenge which has little room for error. To simply disband them is extremely dangerous. JeanPaul Sartre commented: "Violence suits those who have nothing to lose." As a former member of the French Resistance during World War n, he would know. Putting people well-trained to kill on the streets with no jobs or compensation certainly risks giving them "nothing to lose," and the potential for waves of violent crime and an insurgency becomes very real. Even the Iraqi manual on Guerrilla Warfare (1995) prescribes as the first means of recruiting for an insurgent force is from a defeated army. Although the publication was written in 2007, it parallels arguments made by prewar focus groups and these debatable points were available to planners and to decision makers. 46 resented receiving orders from their previous enemies and having dual chains of command. 51 In both periods, the British and Americans dictated actions to the Iraqi Army and were accused of only providing enough defense equipment to guard the interests of the occupying force. 52 The conditions and humiliation created from being ruled by non-Muslim former enemies, He instead elected to purge the leadership of the Iraqi Army and ensure they were replaced by more moderate leaders. 56 This proved valuable as they were required to defeat a Kurdish rebellion during the mid 1940s. 57 Unfortunately, the CPA did not follow the British trend and did not have domestic forces to combat insurgents, criminals, and foreign fighters, but instead fed the insurgency with unemployed soldiers and dejected Baathists unable to participate in the new government.
Ill: Historical Comparisons
The lesson that Paul Bremer could have most benefited from in the occupation of Germany was the consequences of de-Nazification. General Lucius Clay, who was in charge of the occupation of Germany in 1945, quickly discovered that former Nazis were effective in governing, and the best equipped to administer the infrastructure. Additionally, being a Nazi was a matter of economic benefit and employment. This was also the scenario with Baathists in Iraq. Being a Nazi did not mean you were of same mind as Hitler and being a member of the Baathist party did not automatically mean you subscribed to Saddam Hussein's agenda.'
Employing former Nazis during post-WWII occupation was downgraded from "under no circumstances" to as lorig as you were not an "active" Nazi and completed a questionnaire.58
This Nazi questionnaire,fragebogen, is probably where Bremer got the idea of the de-Baathification letter. The choice was to either rebuild Germany using former Nazis or not rebuilding it at al1. 59 Not too different from the~xperience in Iraq replacing "Nazi" with "Baathist". 
v. The Consequences ofDisbanding Iraqi Military
The passing of CPA General Order Number One, "De-Baathification of Iraqi Society" coupled with CPA General Order Number Two, "Dissolution of Entities", sent shockwaves throughout Iraq's population as well as the U.S. ground forces and reconstruction teams in Iraq.
Within one week the CPA had disenfranchised at least 450,000 people. Of those, 400,000 were Iraqi soldiers. The immediate reaction to disbanding the Iraqi military was one that Paul"Bremer had failed to calculate, and the Iraqi perception of the former army was one that few could predict, but it was powerful enough to collide with ECLIPSE II and set it off course. The former army felt humiliated, deceived, and in a powerless~ituation to set a course for their future and care for their families. Unemployed and infuriated, they turned to other outlets to demonstrate their displeasure.
The Iraqi Army was the last symbol of sovereignty to a war-torn nation needing liberation from a brutal dictator. Invaded by a non-Muslim force, but also liberated, many Iraqis were willing to welcome the coalition with warm hearts, but they were not willing to be Army officer who joined the insurgency stated he joined due to the "shame and humiliation at the dissolution of the army.,,74
The insurgency began to mature after the dissolution of the Iraqi Army. ECLIPSE II, Phase IV, assumed the use of the Iraqi Army to assist in reconstruction. The Iraqi military was to undergo a DDR process and then be paid and assigned tasks to assist with the security and reconstruction effort. The plan called for an initial 40,000 Iraqi soldiers to be used with more added as required, and as U.S. troops redeployed home. 84 The Iraqi soldiers not being immediately employed were to be paid to maintain recall information and to be at a ready status. 85 This plan would not be seen as ideal to the Iraqi populace either, and probably heavily criticized as well, but it allowed for the Iraqi Army to be recalled and stood up much faster than the course of action that was employed. This plan was briefed and approved by the President, 109 Unfortunately, the damage was done and the Iraqi soldiers grew disdainful for the Americans who they believed had apparently fooled them into not fighting during the offensive just so they could subdue them after they occupied Iraq.
A consistent argument that Bremer offered to defend his decision was that the Iraqi Army , had disbanded itself and did not have any barracks. Curiously, he did not recognize the fact that they were able to reconstitute for protests. He also ignored a meeting that Colonel Hughes, General McKiernan, and General Abizaid had held where prominent Iraqi leaders told them they could easily bring the army back. 110 Walter Slocomb, who also attended the meeting, told them their services were not required. I I I The CPA and political circles in Washington failed to appreciate that even if the army's facilities were looted, the Iraqi Army could occupy areas just as U.S. forces did, in hangers and former palaces and temporary shelters provided by U.S.
contractors. It appears this argument was a red herring for the fear that 
VII. Conclusion with Recommended Solution
The U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi military via Paul Bremer and the CPA was the result of narrow thinking by policy makers unable to discern reality and practicality from preconceived ideals. None of the policy makers were accustomed to negotiating the complexities of chaos often encountered in war in order to achieve an end state, and those that had a better understanding of the situation, and were responsible for executing and dealing with the consequences of the decision, were not consulted or heeded. The decision was also a product "I tell you in all frankness that the prerequisite of victory is making soldiers and officers patriots who care for nothing except Iraq, regardless of their affiliations. Focus on this doctrine, the doctrine of equality, the doctrine of the homeland, the doctrine that would spare the army sectarianism, confessionalism, and political partisanship. The army must not be involved in political partisanship and parliamentary life.,,1l4
Given 
